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The Uniform Probate Code and the
Veterans' Administration
!.)A William F. Fratcher
In most states the existing legislation covering the guardianship of
minors and mental incompetents who have some connection with the
Veterans' Administration - the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act -
is a classic example of "legislative overkill." Through three hypotheti-
cals, Professor Fratcher illustrates the operation of the Uniform Veterans'
Guardianship Act and demonstrates that literal application of existing
state laws can lead to surprising and absurd results. After discussing
the background of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, Professor
Fratcher describes Article V of the Uniform Probate Code and analyzes
its effect in replacing the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. He
then discusses and criticizes amendments to Article V proposed by the
Veterans' Administration. Professor Fratcher concludes that with or
without them, Article V is unquestionably preferable to the Uniform
Veterans' Guardianship Act as a solution to present problems of state
schemes.
IKE NUCLEAR OVERKILL, legislative overkill can be costly
KU.4 and wasteful. Most states now suffer from legislative overkill
in the guardianship of minors and mental incompetents who have
some more or less remote connection with the Veterans' Admin-
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hended through a series of ex-ampl
istration. Replacement of the
existing legislation in this field
with the Uniform Probate Code
would eliminate the unneces-
sary statutory overlap and con-
fusion that exist in virtually
every state.' The need for the
sort of solution provided by the
Code is well demonstrated by
the extent of the existing evil,
which can best be compre-
I. EXTENT OF THE EXISTING EvIL
Example 1. The Bates Farm
At the turn of the century Aaron Bates used to sit in his rocking
chair beside the coal stove and recount, for the edification of his
ITo date, only two states have elected to take this course: Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.06.005 to 13.36.100 (1972); and Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-5-101 to -307
(Supp. 1971). See note 160 infra.
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granddaughter, Alice Bates, his adventures as a cavalryman in the
Civil War and as a farmer thereafter. Before age and illness
clouded her memory, Alice could remember vividly the old man's
frequently repeated account of how he bought the 160-acre Bates
Farm with "$194 earned with these-here hands and my first six-
dollar pension check from the government."2
In 1916 Alice married Charles Dent, who served in the Army in
France in 1917 and 1918. He returned home without injury but
was run over and killed in 1925 by a Model T Ford which he was
cranking. Alice collected the $1,000 due on Charles' United States
Government Life Insurance policy' and soon spent the money. In
1927 she married Edward Fox. Fox worked the Bates Farm as
lessee of Alice's father from 1925 until 1950, when her father died
and Alice inherited the farm. Alice and Edward Fox continued to
live on the Bates Farm until 1971. Beginning in 1969, however,
Alice became progressively more bewildered and forgetful, so that
she could not manage the household, and Edward gradually be-
came too feeble to work the farm. The old couple sadly decided to
sell the Bates Farm and move to a retirement home in town.
Midcontinent Hograisers, Inc., offered the excellent price of
$40,000 for the Bates Farm but insisted, in view of Alice's deteri-
oriated mental condition, that the conveyance be made by a guardian
of her estate under court order. Accordingly, proceedings for ap-
pointment of a guardian of Alice's estate and for authority for the
guardian to sell and convey the Bates Farm were instituted under
the general guardianship law, with notice to Alice and all other
notices prescribed by that law. Edward Fox was appointed guardian
and authorized to sell and convey the Bates Farm to Midcontinent
Hograisers, Inc., which he did on July 1, 1971. The proceeds of
the sale were used to pay for Alice's debts and for her lifetime care.
Edward Fox died in December 1971. Alice Fox died intestate in
June 1972, leaving her second cousin, Absalom Bates, as her sole
heir at law. On July 1, 1972, Absalom Bates commenced an action
of ejectment for the Bates Farm against Midcontinent Hograisers,
Inc. The defendant had paid a full and adequate price for the farm
in good faith, without knowledge of any fact indicating that the
2 Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 2, 26 Stat. 182. Pensions granted under this Act
were paid by the Commissioner of Pensions, a predecessor of the present Administra-
tor of Veterans' Affairs.
3 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 320, § 301, 43 Star. 607. Policies issued under this Act
in exchange for World War I war risk insurance were payable by the United States
Veterans' Bureau, a predecessor of the present Veterans' Administration.
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Veterans' Administration had an interest in the guardianship pro-
ceeding. Yet in any of the 29 states4 which have adopted the 1942
version of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act,5 the plaintiff,
Absalom Bates, probably would win the ejectment action because
section 2 of that Act provides:
The Administrator [of Veterans' Affairs] shall be a party in in-
terest... in any suit or other proceeding affecting in any manner the
administration by the guardian of the estate of any present or
former ward whose estate includes assets derived in whole or in
part from benefits heretofore or hereafter paid by the Veterans'
Administration [its predecessors or successors]. Not less than 15
days prior to hearing in such matter notice in writing of the time
and place thereof shall be given by mail (unless waived in writ-
ing) to the office of the Veterans' Administration having jurisdic-
tion over the area in which any such suit or any such proceeding
is pending.6
In the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act "benefits" means
"all moneys paid or payable by the United States through the Vet-
erans' Administration," its predecessors or successors.7 Hence the
six dollars of pension money paid to Aaron Bates in 1890 by the
Commissioner of Pensions and the $1,000 of life insurance proceeds
paid to Alice Dent in 1925 by the United States Veterans' Bureau
were benefits within the meaning of section 2. The Act defines
"ward" as "a beneficiary of the Veterans' Administration," its pre-
decessors or successors, 8 so Alice Fox was a "former ward" within
the meaning of section 2 at the time of the 1971 guardianship pro-
ceeding even though she was not under guardianship when paid the
insurance proceeds in 1925. Because her grandfather used six dol-
lars of his Civil War pension money to pay for the farm in 1890,
Alice's estate included "assets derived . . . . in part from benefits
heretofore . . . . paid by" a predecessor of the Veterans' Adminis-
tration. Therefore, section 2 required 15 days' notice to the Veter-
4 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.385 (1956); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5905.03
(Page 1954).
5 8 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 641 (Master ed. 1972); 1970 HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIssIoNERs ON UNIFoRM STATE LAws AND PRO-
CEEDINGS 388.
6 UNIFORM VETERANS' GUARDIANSmP ACT § 2 (1942 version) [hereinafter cited
as U.V.GA. (1942 version)]. There is some variation among the states as to the notice
requirement: the Hawaii statute, for example, requires 14 days' notice to the Veterans'
Administration, HAwAA REv. STAT. § 552-2 (1968); the Ohio statute requires only
five days' notice, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5905.03 (Page 1954).
7 U.V.G.A. § 1 (1942 version); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.380 (1956); OHio REv.
CODE ANN. § 5905.01 (Page 1954).
SId.
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as' Administration of the hearing on the petition for appointment
of a guardian for Alice's estate and the hearing on the petition for
authorization of the sale of the farm. These notices were not given.
Because Alice Fox was not receiving payments from the Veter-
ans' Administration at the time of the 1971 guardianship proceed-
ing, the only interest that agency had in the proceeding was in pro-
tecting its inchoate right to escheat of assets derived from benefits
payable under laws administered by the Veterans' Administration
in the event a person under guardianship dies intestate without heirs.'
The plaintiff in ejectment, Absalom Bates, however, is not claiming
under or through the Veterans' Administration, but as Alice Fox's
heir. Therefore, the mere fact that the guardianship proceedings
may not have bound the Veterans' Administration would not help
the plaintiff's case if the sale of Bates Farm by her guardian bound
Alice Fox. The fact that a person who was, or should have been, a
party to litigation was not served or notified may prevent him from
being bound by a judgment in that litigation, 0 but it does not neces-
sarily prevent those parties who were properly served or notified
from being bound by a judgment of a superior court of general
jurisdiction proceeding within the general scope of its common law
or equity powers."
There is, however, every indication that the court which ap-
pointed Edward Fox the guardian for Alice Fox was not a superior
court of general jurisdiction proceeding within the general scope
of its common law or equity powers and that, therefore, Absalom
Bates was not bound by the guardianship proceedings or the subse-
quent sale of the Bates Farm to Midcontinent Hograisers, Inc. The
English courts lacked the power to authorize the sale of land of a
mentally incompetent adult until the enactment of the Act of 4 July
9 38 U.S.C. § 3202(e) (1970). It is interesting to speculate whether, if Alice Fox
had died intestate without heirs while under guardianship and owning the Bates Farm,
the Veterans' Administration would have been entitled, under this section, on the basis
of Aaron Bates' investment of six dollars of his Civil War pension in the farm in 1890,
to: (1) the whole Bates Farm; (2) 6/200 of the Bates Farm; (3) a lien on the Bates
Farm for six dollars; or (4) nothing. The mere fact that the benefits were paid to the
veteran before the enactment of the federal escheat statute would not prevent escheat to
the Veterans' Administration of assets purchased with those benefits. In re Estate of
Campbell, 195 Misc. 520, 89 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Surr. Ct. 1949). Cf. Estate of Walker,
25 Cal. 2d 719, 154 P.2d 891 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 869 (1945). The applica-
tion of the federal eschat statute to such property raises serious constitutional problems.
See Estate of Lindquist, 25 Cal. 2d 697, 154 P.2d 879 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
869 (1945).
10 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949); Webster
v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437 (1850).
11 See Vattier v. Hinde, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 252 (1833).
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1803.2 Hence a decree authorizing such sale has never been within
the general scope of the common law or equity powers of the courts.
The power to render such a decree is statutory.1" In this country,
moreover, statutes commonly confer this power on inferior courts
of special and limited jurisdiction.14 Because of these two peculiar-
ities affecting jurisdiction over proceedings to authorize the sale of
land of mental incompetents, the following passages from the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Field in Galin v. Page5 are pertinent:
It is undoubtedly true that a superior court of general jurisdiction,
proceeding within the general scope of its powers . .. is presumed
to have jurisdiction to give the judgments it renders until the con-
trary appears ... . The rule is different with respect to courts of
special and limited authority; as to them there is no presumption
of law in favor of their jurisdiction; that must affirmatively appear
by sufficient evidence or proper averment in the record, or their
judgments will be deemed void on their face.
The presumptions indulged in support of the judgments of su-
perior courts of general jurisdiction are ... limited to jurisdiction
• ..over proceedings which are in accordance with the course of
the common law.
"A court of general jurisdiction... may have special and sum-
mary powers, wholly derived from statutes, not exercised according
to the course of the common law, and which do not belong to it as
a court of general jurisdiction. In such cases, its decisions must be
regarded and treated like those of courts of limited and special
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction in such cases, both as to the subject-
matter of the judgment, and as to the persons affected by it, must
appear by the record; and everything will be presumed to be with-
out the jurisdiction which does not distinctly appear to be within
it."16
12 Ex parte Dikes, 8 Ves. Jun. * 79, 32 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch. 1802); Act of July 4,
1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 75.
13 Berry v. Rogers, 41 Ky. 308 (1842); Latham v. Wiswall, 37 N.C. 294,299 (1842);
J. WOERNmE, AMmuCAN LAw OF GUARDIANSmP § 148 (1897). Cf. Dodge v. Cole,
97 Ill. 338 (1881), Ex parte Drayton, 1 Desaussure 136 (S.C. 1786); Ex parte Drayton,
1 Desaussure 116 (S.C. 1785).
14 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 472.020, 475.200, 475.220-.250 (1956); Omo REV.
CODE §§ 2101.24, 2127.05, 2127.10, 2127.13 (Page 1968).
IS 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873).
16Id. at 365-66, 367, 371. The last paragraph is a quotation from the opinion
in Morse v. Presby, 25 N.H. 299 (1852). In holding that a former ward could recover
in ejectment land sold by his guardian under authorization of the county court, the
New York Court of Appeals said:
It is elementary, that statutory provisions in derogation of the common law,
by which the title of one is to be divested, and transferred to another, must be
strictly pursued, and every requisite thereof having the semblance of benefit
to its owner, must be complied with in order to divest his title. Ellwood v.
Northrup 106.N.Y. 172, 185, 12 N.E. 590, 593 (1887).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 261
Not only is there a presumption against the jurisdiction of a
court of inferior and limited jurisdiction purporting to exercise pow-
ers wholly derived from statutes; but there is also a tendency to hold
that any deviation from the procedures prescribed by statute deprives
the court of jurisdiction, although a like irregularity in the proceed-
ings of a superior court of general jurisdiction acting under its gen-
eral powers would not be deemed to deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion. If a statute requires that notice of the hearing on a petition
for appointment of a guardian be given to someone other than the
ward, the court lacks jurisdiction to make the appointment if the
notice prescribed by statute is not given.' 7 It is commonly held that
if notice of the hearing on either the petition for appointment of the
guardian or the petition for authority to sell is not given as pre-
scribed by statute, a guardian's sale of the ward's land is void and
the ward or his successor in interest may recover the land by an
action of ejectment against the purchaser.' In such case, the pur-
chaser may have no effective remedy for recovery of the price which
'7 Seaverns v. Gerke, 21 F. Cas. 941 (No. 12,595) (C.C.D. Cal. 1875); In re Eiker-
enkotter's Estate, 126 Cal. 54, 58 P. 370 (1899); Edwards v. Lampkin, 112 Ga. App.
128, 144 S.E.2d 119 (1965); Devereaux v. Janes, 141 Mich. 265, 104 N.W. 579 (1905);
In re Guardianship of Kelley, 1 Ohio App. 2d 137, 204 N.E.2d 96 (1964) (semble);
Smith v. Page, 117 Okla. 223, 246 P. 217 (1926); Myers v. Harness, 116 Okla. 268,
244 P. 1109 (1925). See Davis v. Hudson, 29 Minn. 27, 32-34, 11 N.W. 136, 138
(1881); State ex rel. Kassen v. Carver, 355 S.W.2d 324, 329-30 (Mo. App. 1962);
Erickson v. McCullough, 91 Utah 159, 167-69, 63 P.2d 595, 599 (1937). Cf. Hart v.
Gray, 11 F. Cas. 686 (No. 6,152) (C.C.D.R.I. 1838); Arrington v. Arrington, 32 Ark.
674 (1878); Skelly v. The Maccabees, 217 Mo. App. 333, 272 S.W. 1089 (1925);
Bobo v. Bell, 171 Ohio St. 311, 170 N.E.2d 730 (1960); Hawkins v. Tiger, 163 Okla.
55, 20 P.2d 578 (1933); Harness v. Myers, 143 Okla. 147, 288 P. 285 (1930). Other
cases are collected in Annots., 92 A.L.R.2d 1336, 1338-40 (1963); 2 A.LR.2d 6, 14,
187-97 (1948); 109 A.L.R. 338-45 (1937).
18 Seaverns v. Gerke, 21 F. Cas. 941 (No. 12,595) (C.C.D. Cal. 1875); Hobart v.
Upton, 12 F. Cas. 259 (No. 6,548) (C.C.D. Ore. 1872); Molton v. Henderson, 62
Ala. 426 (1878); White v. White Co., 4 Alas. 317 (1911); Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Dougl.
433, 47 Am. Dec. 41 (Mich. 1847); Bennett v. Hayden, 145 Pa. 586, 23 A. 400
(1891). Cf. Martin v. White, 146 F. 461 (9th Cir. 1906); McGee v. Hayes, 127 Cal.
336, 59 P. 767 (1899); Townsend v. Tipton, 289 Ky. 766, 160 S.W.2d 161, 142
A.LR. 306 (1942) (administrator's sale of land void as against minor heirs because
notice of hearing required by statute not given to their mother); Clapper v. Chandler,
406 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. App. 1966), discussed in Basye, Are Probate Courts in Missouri
Undergoing Retrogression?, 32 Mo. L. REV. 175, 177-84 (1967) (administrator's sale
of land void as against an heir who attended the sale, because notice of hearing pre-
scribed by statute defective); In re Guardianship of Reynolds, 103 Ohio App. 102, 144
N.E.2d 501 (1956); In re Koenigshoff, 99 Ohio App. 39, 119 N.E.2d 652 (1954).
But see Dutcher v. Hill, 29 Mo. 271 (1860); In re Bireley's Guardianship, 41 Ohio L
Abs. 604, 59 N.E.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1944); Oldham v. Winger, 47 Ohio App. 287, 191
N.E. 824 (1933); Jordan v. Dickson, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 332, 20 Ohio L.J. 360
(1888). Other cases are collected in Annots., 138 A.L.R. 1364-69 (1942); 23 A.L.R.
594-609 (1923).
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he paid to the guardian.19 Thus, under section 2 of the Uniform
Veterans' Guardianship Act requiring notice to be served upon the
Veterans' Administration, Absalom Bates will probably succeed in
his suit for ejectment against Midcontinent Hograisers, Inc.
Example 2. The Harrison Ranch
When George Harrison died in 1965 he devised most of his
multi-million dollar estate, including the Harrison Ranch, to his
daughter Gertrude, who had married Irwin Jones in 1941. Irwin
Jones served as an officer in World War II. After the war he con-
verted his term-plan $10,000 National Service Life Insurance policy
to the twenty-pay life plan and it became fully paid-up in 1962.20
Irwin Jones filed forms with the Veterans' Administration designat-
ing his wife Gertrude as beneficiary of the policy and electing pay-
ment Option 3, under which Gertrude would be entitled to monthly
payments throughout her life.21
Gertrude and Irwin Jones were riding in one of their Cadillacs
along Highway 13 on an afternoon in July 1971, when they collided
with a Dachshund bus, being driven on the wrong side of the road.
Irwin Jones, the Jones' chauffeur, and the bus driver were killed.
Gertrude Jones was taken to the hospital in a deep coma. Attend-
ing physicians were not sure that she would ever regain conscious-
ness.
The day after the collision Kenneth Leach, manager of the Har-
rison Ranch, received word that Criterion Oil Company (Ohio) was
about to drill for oil in the area and was willing to pay generously
for a lease giving exclusive exploration and drilling rights in the
Harrison Ranch. Leach knew that if wells were drilled beyond the
borders of the Harrison Ranch, the oil under the ranch could be re-
moved without compensation or profit to Mrs. Jones. He realized,
therefore, that it was of great importance to negotiate a lease with
the oil company while it was willing to take one. Accordingly,
Kenneth Leach called at once on Martin Nelson, the Jones' lawyer,
who was already busy preparing for the probate of Irwin Jones'
will and the administration of his estate. Leach had no trouble in
convincing Nelson that it was important to secure authority without
delay for giving an oil lease binding the Harrison Ranch.
19 Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 IIl. 356 (1881); Bone v. Tyrrell, 113 Mo. 175, 20
S.W. 796 (1892). See also Douglas v. Bennett, 51 Miss. 680 (1875). Other cases
are collected in Annoc., 142 A.L.R. 310 (1943).
2 0 Act of Oct. 8, 1940, ch. 757, § 602(f), 54 Stat. 10009.
2138 U.S.C § 717 (1970); 38 C.F.R. §§ 8.79-8.88 (1972).
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Martin Nelson had Gertrude Jones' five children sign a petition
for the appointment of a guardian of her estate on the ground that
she was mentally incapacitated. The physicians attending Mrs.
Jones at the hospital testified at length as to her incapacity and the
court appointed Ashford National Bank guardian of Mrs. Jones' es-
tate. The new guardian at once negotiated an oil lease to Criterion Oil
Company (Ohio) on terms which were very advantageous to Mrs.
Jones and petitioned the court for, and was granted, authority to
execute the lease. Knowing of the National Service Life Insurance
policy, Nelson took the extra precaution of securing written waivers
of notice of hearing from the Veterans' Administration as to both
the hearing on the petition for appointment of a guardian and the
petition for authority to lease.22  Late in July, Ashford National
Bank, as guardian of the estate of Gertrude Jones, executed a lease
giving exclusive oil exploration and drilling rights in the Harri-
son Ranch to Criterion Oil Company (Ohio).
Gertrude Jones emerged from coma in August 1971, and was dis-
charged from the hospital in October. She spent the winter in
the Caribbean and did not attempt to handle any business matters
until her return to the Harrison Ranch in June 1972. Kenneth
Leach, the ranch manager, was away attending the funeral of a
member of his family when Mrs. Jones returned. On the day of her
arrival a representative of the Criterion Oil Company (Missouri),
a competitor of the Criterion Oil Company (Ohio), called at the
ranch and presented Mrs. Jones with his company's handsome offer
for an oil lease giving exclusive exploration and drilling rights in
the Harrison Ranch. Unaware of the events of July 1971, Mrs.
Jones executed the desired lease.
The two rival oil companies are now litigating their rights in
the Harrison Ranch. It is probable that the lease given in July
1971, by Ashford National Bank, as guardian of the estate of Ger-
trude Jones, will be held void because the petition for appointment
of the guardian did not comply with section 5 of the 1942 version
of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, which provides: "(4)
In the case of a mentally incompetent ward the petition shall show
that such ward has been rated incompetent by the Veterans' Admin-
istration on examination in accordance with the laws and regulations
governing the Veterans' Administration."'
22UV.G.A. § 2 (1942 version).
23 Id. § 5 (1942 version). For examples of state enactments of this provision, see
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.400 (4) (1956); OHIo REV. STAT. ANN. § 5905.05 (Page 1954).
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Because in July 1971 Gertrude Jones was entitled to money
payable by the United States through the Veterans' Admin-
istration under her deceased husband's National Service Life Insur-
ance policy, she was then a "present ward" of the Veterans' Admin-
istration.14  Procedure under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship
Act would seem to be the exclusive method of securing the ap-
pointment of a guardian of the estate of a mental incompetent who
is a present ward of the Veterans' Administration.2 5
There is, however, serious question as to whether Gertrude Jones
was "mentally incompetent" within the meaning of the quoted pro-
vision of the Act. If she was, it is also questionable whether com-
pliance was possible since the "laws and regulations governing the
Veterans' Administration" appear to make no provision for mental
examination or a rating as incompetent of a person who is merely
a beneficiary of a National Service Life Insurance policy.26
Nevertheless, the language of the statute is mandatory. If it ap-
plies to a person in Mrs. Jones' situation, it would seem that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for her estate
in the absence of an allegation in the petition for appointment that
Mrs. Jones had been rated incompetent by the Veterans' Administra-
tionY27 If the court lacked jurisdiction to appoint Ashford National
Bank as guardian of the estate of Mrs. Jones, it probably also lacked
jurisdiction to entertain and act upon the bank's petition for author-
ity to grant the oil lease2 8 If this is so, the oil lease executed by
the bank is a nullity even though the lessee may not have known
facts sufficient to put it upon notice of the fact that Mrs. Jones had
become by her husband's death a present ward of the Veterans' Ad-
ministration.
Example 3. The Pennyworth Stock
Orlando Palmer had just finished his second year in law school
when he was drafted in 1943. After his discharge from the Army
24 U.V.G-A. § 1 (1942 version).
25 U.V.G.A. § 22 (1942 version); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.015, 475.475 (1956).
See Krupp v. Franklin Say. Bank, 255 App. Div. 15, 5 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1938); In re
Parker, 168 Tenn. 327, 330-31, 77 S.W.2d 816, 817 (1935). But see DeWald v. Mor-
ris, 397 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. App. 1965).
26 See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.353, 8.64, 17.45, 17.45a (1972).
27 Ball v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 92 Md. 503, 48 A. 155 (1901); Brandee v.
Beale, 110 Neb. 686, 194 N.W. 787 (1923); Providence County Sav. Bank v. Hughes,
26 R.I. 73, 58 A. 254 (1904).
28 Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 27 A. 229 (1893). See O'Herron v. Gray, 168
Mass. 573, 47 N.E. 429 (1897); Myers v. McGavock, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N.W. 522, 524
(1894).
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in 1946, he completed law school under the so-called GI Bill of
Rights.29 Pursuant to this legislation the Veterans' Administration
paid his third-year law school tuition and fees, a subsistence allow-
ance, and the cost of necessary law books, including Black's Law
Dictionary (3rd ed. 1933), Atkinson on Wills (1st ed. 1937),
Simes' Cases on Future Interests (1st ed. 1939) and Simes' Cases on
Fiduciary Administration (1st ed. 1941). Orlando Palmer married
Quinta Ramsay in 1953 and their daughter, Quintilla, was born in
1954. Soon thereafter, Orlando Palmer paid a substantial sum to the
Veterans' Administration for the conversion of his $10,000 term
policy of National Service Life Insurance to an ordinary life policy
as of 1943.30 At the same time he designated his wife as primary
beneficiary and his daughter as contingent beneficiary and elected
Option 3 (insurance payable in installments throughout life) for
each of them.-"
Orlando and Quinta Palmer were killed in an automobile col-
lision in 1970. Her maternal uncle, Quintus Ramsay, was appointed
guardian of the person and estate of Quintilla Palmer, a minor, af-
ter due notice to the Veterans' Administration and compliance with
all other provisions of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.32
The Veterans' Administration promptly commenced monthly pay-
ments of $35.80 each under the National Service Life Insurance pol-
icy to the guardian. In 1971, upon completion of administration,
the executor of Orlando Palmer's will distributed the entire net
estate, valued at about $150,000, including the four law books and
a large sum in cash, to the guardian. The guardian then petitioned
the court for authority to invest surplus funds, in compliance with
section 13 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. He pro-
vided the Veterans' Administration with a signed duplicate copy of
the petition as required by that section and with 15 days' notice of
the hearing, as required by section 10. After the hearing, the court
authorized the guardian to invest most of the cash in a well-diversi-
fied portfolio of good bonds and stocks of corporations with estab-
lished reputations and histories of regular dividend payments.
Among the investments authorized by the court order was that of
$10,000 of money derived from the estate of Orlando Palmer, de-
29 Act of June 22, 1944, ch. 268, § 400(b), 58 Star. 284, 287-89.
30 38 U.S.C. § 704 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 21, 1947, ch. 5, § 2,
61 Star. 5); 38 C.F.R. § 8.34 (1972).
3' 38 U.S.C. § 717 (1970); 38 C.F.R. §§ 8.76, 8.77, 8.79, 8.91 (1972).
3 2 U.V.G.A. §§ 2 (notice to VA), 5 (form of petition), 8 (notice to ward and VA),
9 (bond with qualified sureties) (1942 version).
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ceased, in 100 shares of the common stock of the S. S. Pennyworth
Company, a well-established corporation which operates a large and
rapidly expanding chain of discount department stores.
The validity of such court order in some states is doubtful.3
For example, the Ohio statute permits a fiduciary to invest up to
60 per cent of all of the property of the fund held by such fiduciary
in corporate stock but the statute limits the authority conferred by
it to "a fiduciary, including a guardian, other than a guardian under"
the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.34 A comment on this
statutory section states that "[a] guardian appointed under the Vet-
erans' Guardianship Law may not invest moneys received from the
Veterans' Administration under" this section.85 If this comment is
correct, the court order would be valid in Ohio because it did not
relate to moneys received from the Veterans' Administration. The
correctness of the comment is questionable, however, because in
Ohio, as in most other states in which the problem can arise, it is not
clear from the statutory language whether the restrictions of the
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act affect the administration of
property not derived, wholly or in part, from benefits paid by the
Veterans' Administration when the ward also owns property so de-
rived.38 Quintilla Palmer does own four law books derived from
benefits paid by the Veterans' Administration.
Quintus Ramsay is a university professor. During the latter part
of May and early June 1972, the interval between the end of the
spring semester and the beginning of the summer session, he and
Mrs. Ramsay took their children and his ward, Quintilla Palmer, on
a three-week vacation trip to Rocky Mountain National Park. When
the Ramsays returned from this trip on Sunday, June 11, Quintus
Ramsay found among his accumulated mail a letter from the S. S.
Pennyworth Company, dated May 19, 1972, enclosing a warrant ex-
piring June 15, 1972, for enforcement of the preemptive rights of
Quintilla Palmer, as owner of 100 shares of stock, to purchase 100
33 On the other hand, the court order would clearly be valid in Missouri, for exam-
pie, where the court has express statutory power to authorize a guardian, including one
subject to the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, to invest in "[a~ny property,
real or personal, which the court finds, after hearing, is a reasonable and prudent in-
vestment in the circumstances." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.190 (Supp. 1973), § 475.440
(1956). It is well settled that corporate stock may be a reasonable and prudent invest-
ment. Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29 (1940); St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App. 559, 140 S.W.2d 68 (1940).
34 OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2109.371 (Page Supp. 1971).
351d. § 2109.371, Comment (Page 1968).
86 See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
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shares of a new issue at $100 per share. On Monday, June 12, 1972,
Quintus Ramsay found through inquiry that Pennyworth stock was
selling at $120 per share and that the prospects of the company were
considered excellent. At that time, the guardianship bank account
had a balance of $11,000, derived partly from payments made by
the Veterans' Administration and partly from the income of securi-
ties purchased pursuant to the 1971 court order. Quintus Ramsey
sent the warrant to the S. S. Pennyworth Company, endorsed with
an election to purchase the full 100 shares at $100 each, and ac-
companied by a check drawn on the guardianship bank account for
$10,000. These papers reached the S. S. Pennyworth Company on
June 14, 1972, the same day upon which a petition was filed in the
guardianship proceeding for approval of the stock purchase. A copy
of the petition was delivered to the Veterans' Administration, to-
gether with a notice that the hearing on the petition would be held
on June 30, 1972, in compliance with sections 2, 10, and 13 of the
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.
The S. S. Pennyworth Company refused to honor the election to
purchase 100 shares of stock made on the warrant issued to Quintilla
Palmer by her guardian, Quintus Ramsay. The reasons given by the
company for its refusal were: (1) The terms of the warrant required
the purchase to be on or before June 15, 1972; (2) section 13 of
the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act permits a guardian to in-
vest in other than federal and state obligations "only upon prior
order of the court;" (3) a corporation which sells stock to a guard-
ian or registers a transfer of stock to him with knowledge that he
lacks power to invest his ward's funds in that stock commits an il-
legal act and incurs liability to the ward for any decline in the value
of the stock;37 and (4) under a statutory provision such as section
13, a court order entered after the stock purchase, purporting to
ratify and approve it, would be a nullity which would not make the
37 Humphries v. Manhattan Say. Bank & Trust Co., 174 Tenn. 17, 122 S.W.2d 446
(1938); Freeman v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 167 Tenn. 399, 70 S.W.2d 25 (1934). See
Sontag v. Stix, 355 Mo. 972, 199 S.W.2d 371, noted in 33 VA. L. REV. 652 (1947);
Grigsby v. First Nat'l Bank, 136 Tex. 54, 144 S.W.2d 244 (1940). Cf. King v. Rich-
ardson, 136 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 77 (1943); Leake v. Wat-
son, 58 Conn. 332, 20 A. 343 (1890). Legislation recently enacted in many states
would relieve such a corporation from the duty of inquiring into the guardian's powers
of investment but would not relieve it from liability if it acted with knowledge that the
guardian lacked power to enter into the transaction. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 8-304, 8-318, 8-401 to -403; UNIFORM ACT FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY
SECURiTy TRANSFERS 88 3, 7; UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES ACT § 3; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
400.8-401 to -403 (1965), §§ 403.270, 403.310 (Supp. 1973); OIO RE V. CODE ANN.
§§ 1308.31-1308.33 (Page 1962), § 2109.29 (Page 1968).
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purchase legal or protect the corporation against liability to the
ward.38
It is highly probable that, because of section 13 of the Uniform
Veterans' Guardianship Act, the S. S. Pennyworth Company cannot
be compelled to honor its warrant. Hence, solely because she is re-
ceiving installments of $35.80 per month on the proceeds of life
insurance for which her father paid the full premiums from his
own income,"9 Quintilla Palmer, who has assets worth $150,000,
cannot take advantage of an opportunity to purchase an excellent
investment with an immediate profit of $2,000.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE UNIFORM
VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP ACT
World War I resulted in a great increase in the number of per-
sons entitled to federal hospitalization or money payments because
of death or disability incurred by them, or some person upon whom
they had been dependent, in military service. Many mentally in-
competent veterans and minor children of deceased veterans were
entitled to disability or death compensation. The United States Vet-
erans' Bureau, created in 1921, 40 had difficulties with state court ap-
pointed guardians of these beneficiaries, since many such guardians
were incompetent, dishonest, and overpaid. In 1924 Congress auth-
orized the Director of the Veterans' Bureau to suspend payments
to guardians who refused to account to him "from time to time
showing the application of such payments for the benefit of such
minor or incompetent beneficiary." 41 Two years later, the Congress
authorized the Director to intervene in guardianship proceedings to
3 8 Parker v. Wilson, 98 Ark. 553, 136 S.W. 981 (1911); In re Cannon, 231 Iowa
366, 1 N.W.2d 217 (1941); In re Morris' Guardianship, 228 Iowa 646, 292 N.W.
836 (1940); Erwin v. Patterson, 229 S.C. 188, 92 S.E.2d 464 (1956); Hines v. Thomp-
son, 25 Tenn. App. 86, 148 S.W.2d 376 (1940); State ex rel. Wilson v. Meek, 24 Tenn.
App. 492, 146 S.W.2d 961 (1938); McCuiston v. Haggard, 21 Tenn. App. 277, 109
S.W.2d 413 (1937). See In re Estate of Avchin, 158 Misc. 388, 285 N.Y.S. 762 (Surr.
Ct. 1936). But see Hoffman v. Stoudemire, 42 Ala. 593 (1868); O'Hara v. Shep-
herd, 3 Md. Ch. 306 (1851); Marks v. Marks, 58 Ohio App. 266, 16 N.E.2d 509
(1937); Barrineau v. Barrineau, 209 S.C. 317, 40 S.E.2d 41 (1946).
39 The premium rates on United States Government (World War I) and National
Service (World War II) Life Insurance are the same as those charged by commercial in-
surance companies except that the government beats the administrative expense and the
extra cost of the risks of war. Brief History of Legislation Pertaining to Veterans'
Benefits, 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-1500, at 31 (1959); 38 U.S.C. §§ 702, 744 (1970).
40 Act of Aug. 9, 1921, ch. 57, 42 Star. 147.
41 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 320, § 21, 43 Stat 613.
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present to the state court information as to misbehavior by guard-
ians.42
In 1927 the Veterans' Bureau asked the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to approve a draft of a
"Uniform Probate and Commitment Act" designed: (1) to compel
state courts to recognize that the Veterans' Bureau was an interested
party entitled to intervene in guardianship proceedings for persons
to whom it was paying money; (2) to regulate the compensation of
guardians of such persons; and (3) to empower state courts to com-
mit mentally incompetent veterans to Veterans' Bureau hospitals. 43
In 1928 the National Conference and the American Bar Association
approved a Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.44 By the end of
the following year, this or similar legislation was adopted in 33
states.
45
The 1928 Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act would not have
created the problems involved in examples 1 (the Bates Farm) and
3 (the Pennyworth Stock) because: (1) it did not apply to former
wards of the Veterans' Bureau; 46 (2) it did not require notice to the
Veterans' Bureau of hearings on petitions for appointment of a
guardian or authority to sell land;47 and (3) it did not require a
prior order of the court authorizing any type of investment.48 More-
over, its restraints were limited to moneys received by a guardian
from the Veterans' Bureau, so that it could have no application what-
ever to the Bates Farm, six dollars of the purchase price of which
was paid by money received by Aaron Bates directly from the gov-
ernment in 1890, or to the law books provided directly to Quintilla
Palmer's father in 1946."9 The problem involved in example 2 (the
Harrison Ranch) could have arisen under the 1928 Act, however,
42Act of July 2, 1926, ch. 723, § 2, 44 Stat. 791 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3202
(1970)).
43 1929 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 368-72 [hereinafter cited as 1929 HAND-
BOOK].
44 1928 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 95-96, 100-06, 532-39 [hereinafter cited as
1928 HANDBOOK]. The text of the 1928 version of the U.V.G.A. is printed at 535-39.
45 1929 HANDBOOK 368-69. The name "Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act"
was misleading; the explanation promulgated with the Act made it clear that most of
the minors and incompetents whose guardianships were affected were not veterans. 1928
HANDBOOK 532.
46 U.V.G.A. § 1 (1928 version).
47'd § 7.
481d. § 12.
49 1d. §§ 1, 9.
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because it, like the 1942 version, required the petition for appoint-
ment of a guardian of an incompetent ward to show that she had
been rated incompetent on examination by the Bureau.' The ex-
planation promulgated with the Act suggests that the draftsmen did
not appreciate the fact that the language of the Act included guard-
ianships of incompetents who were not veterans. 51
The problems of the Veterans' Bureau, which became the Vet-
erans' Administration on July 21, 1930,52 were greatly increased by
legislation of 1930 authorizing payment of $40 per month to dis-
abled veterans whose disabilities were not connected with military
service if their income was so small that they were exempt from fed-
eral income tax.3 This added a large class of beneficiaries who
were virtually destitute and whose guardians were likely to be so
poor as to be under great temptation to divert part of these generous
payments to their own support or that of their own families. In
1934 Congress further increased the class of pauper beneficiaries
by authorizing payment of $22 a month to destitute widows and
children of deceased veterans of World War I who had had service-
connected disabilities, even though death was not caused by a ser-
vice-connected disability.54  The result of this legislation was that
Veterans' Administration lawyers were spending much of their time
on guardianships of persons whose sole means of support was
monthly payments made 'by the Veterans' Administration.
By 1941 the Veterans' Administration was advocating amend-
ments to the 1928 Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was con-
sidering revision of that Act.55 In the following year, the National
Conference and the American Bar Association approved the 1942
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act with which, as a result of
5O ld. § 4.
51 1928 HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 532.
5 Brief History of Legislation Pertaining to Veterans' Benefits, supra note 39, at 5.
53 Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 849, § 11, 46 Stat. 995 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 521
(1970)). In 1957 the means test was changed to annual income of $1,400. Act of
June 17, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 422, 71 Stat. 106 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 522
(1970)).
54 Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 867, 48 Star. 1281 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 541-43
(1970)). The 1934 Act's means test was income so low as to be exempt from federal
income tax. In 1939 the monthly pension was increased to $30 and the means test
changed to income not exceeding $1,000 per annum. Act of July 19, 1939, ch. 331, §§
1, 2, 53 Stat. 1069. The requirement of a service-connected disability was eliminated
and the pension increased to $35 per month by the Act of Dec. 14, 1944, ch. 581, §§
1, 2, 58 Star. 803.
551941 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONmS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 14, 96.
1973]
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examples 1, 2, and 3, the reader is now familiar.56 The most aston-
ishing thing about the promulgation of this Act is its Prefatory
Note,57 which gives the impression that the Act is restricted to guard-
ianships of disabled veterans. Neither that note nor the Commis-
sioners' comments on section 258 give any reason whatever for the
drastic change from the 1928 Act, which was limited to guardian-
ships of persons presently receiving money from the Veterans'
Bureau and moneys received by the guardian from that Bureau, "9
to the 1942 Act extension to guardianships of former wards with as-
sets derived from moneys paid to anyone by a government agency
dealing with veterans.
The defects of the 1942 Act have been illustrated by the three
examples. First, it appears to make notice to the Veterans' Admin-
istration a prerequisite to jurisdiction in guardianship proceedings
for any person who has ever received any money from the Veter-
ans' Administration or a predecessor, if he has any asset derived in
whole or in part from money paid by the Veterans' Administration
or its predecessors to anyone.60 How could a lawyer instituting a
guardianship proceeding for Alice Fox in 1971 ascertain that she
had received money from the Veterans' Bureau in 1925 and that six
dollars of Civil War pension money was used in the purchase of the
Bates Farm in 1890? How could a lawyer called in to obtain guard-
ianship protection for a raving lunatic be sure that he did not re-
ceive a dividend in 1946 on a since-expired term National Service
Life Insurance policy and that none of his land was ever owned by
a veteran of the American Revolution, the Seminole War, or the
Mexican War who used some pension money to pay for it? Second,
the 1942 Act appears to require a rating of "incompetent" after ex-
amination by the Veterans' Administration as a prerequisite to juris-
diction in guardianship proceedings for any person presently entitled
to receive money from the Veterans' Administration, even though
the person is not a veteran and is not eligible for examination or
56 1942 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COIMSSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 82-83, 85-86, 122, 201-23 [hereinafter
cited as 1942 HANDBOOK]. The text of the 1942 version of the U.V.G.A. is printed
at 206-23.
57 1942 HANDBOOK 201-05; 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 318-22 (1957). See Davis,
The Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 3 ALA. LAwYER 185-93 (1942); Imlay, Uni-
form Veterans' Guardianship Act, 12 J. BAR ASS'N D.C. 378-86 (1945).
5 8 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 325 (1957).
69 U.V.G.A. §§ 1, 9 (1928 version).
60 Id..§ 2 (1942 version).
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rating by the Veterans' Administration.61 Third, the Act does not
make it clear whether the restrictions imposed on administration of
the ward's estate by the guardian extend to property not derived
from money paid by the Veterans' Administration or its predeces-
sors. 2 If those restrictions do extend to such property, they make
economical and efficient management of a substantial portfolio of
securities impossible.
III. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The- reporters who drafted the Uniform Probate Code between
1963 and 1969 were aware of the defects of the 1942 Uniform Vet-
erans' Guardianship Act.63 They did not wish to impair the ability
of the Veterans' Administration to protect the veterans, and their
widows and children, who were under guardianship and receiving
disability compensation, dependency and indemnity compensation, or
pensions. They saw no reason, however, to make any different pro-
vision for the Veterans' Administration than for other government
agencies, providing similar benefits, such as the Social Security Ad-
ministration. They could not see that any purpose of the Veterans'
Administration was furthered by the overkill described in the three
examples and they were particularly anxious to avoid the problem
of transactions involving property of persons under guardianship
being void for want of court jurisdiction because those conducting
the guardianship proceeding were unable to ascertain that the Vet-
erans' Administration was an interested and necessary party. The
reporters sought to supersede both the existing general guardianship
laws and the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act with a single
system for protection of minors and mental incompetents, with
proper recognition of the interests of the Veterans' Administration
and all like agencies providing similar benefits for minors and men-
tal incompetents.
. The Uniform Probate Code was approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
6 1 See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
6 2 U.V.G.A. § 22 (1942 version); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.015, 475A75 (1956).
See Krupp v. Franklin Sav. Bank, 255 App. Div. 15, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (1938); In re
Parker, 168 Tenn. 327, 330-31, 77 S.W.2d 816, 817 (1935). But see DeWald v.
Morris, 397 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. App. 1965).
63 See Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA L. REv.
264-68 (1960), and Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legislation, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 983, 987-90 (1966), combined and revised in 2 I.ANDMARK PAPERS ON ESTATE
PLANNING, WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 942, 944-48 (A. Winard ed. 1968).
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Bar Association in August 1969.64 Article V of the Code, Protec-
tion of Persons Under Disability and Their Property, relates to pro-
tection of the persons and property of minors and mental incompe-
tents.65 Under this article protection of the person is provided by
the appointment of a guardian;6  protection of the property of a
person under disability is provided by protective proceedings which
may include the appointment of a conservator of the estate.
Under Article V a parent of an unmarried minor may appoint a
guardian of his child by will,68 and a spouse or parent of a mental
incompetent may appoint a guardian of the incompetent by will. "9
The intended ward, however, has standing to object to a testamen-
tary appointment of a guardian if the ward has reached the age of
fourteen.7" The court may appoint a guardian for a mental in-
competent.' If there is no parent or testamentary guardian, it may
appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor.7 The court may re-
move a guardian, whatever the source of his appointment, upon pe-
64 1969 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 101-06; 94 A.B.A. RiP. 400 (1969). The
text of the Code does not appear in either the Handbook or the Report. A preliminary
version was published in Wills, Estates and Trust Serv. Bull. 6 in P-H EST. PLAN.
(1969). UNIFORM PROBATE CODE - OFFICIAL TEXT wrH COMMENTS (West
Publishing Co. 1970, reprinted with index 1972) [hereinafter cited as U.P.C.] is a
revised version. The latter version, with slight changes, is in 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
281-592 (Master ed. 1972).
6rU.P.C. §§ 5-101 to -502. These provisions are discussed in Fratcher, Missouri
and the Uniform Probate Code, 26 J. Mo. B. 349, 357-59 (1970), and in Fratcher,
Estate Planning and Administration Under the Uniform Probate Code, 110 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 5, 73-74 (1971) and at greater length in Fratcher, Persons Under Disability in
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 195-250, 417-71 (R. Wright ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as PRACTICE MANUAL].
66U.P.C. §§ 5-201 to -313.
67 Id. §§ 5-401 to -413.
68 U.P.C. § 5-202. Such an appointment does not take effect while the child has a
living parent competent to care for him. If both parents are dead, an appointment by
the parent who died last has priority. For a form of appointment by will, see PRACTICE
MANUAL Form 104, at 432.
69 U.P.C. § 5-301. An appointment by the spouse has priority over one by a parent.
As between appointments by parents, the priorities are the same as in the case of an un-
married minor. See note 68 supra. For a form of appointment by will, see PRACTICE
MANUAL Form 112, at 442.
70 U.P.C. §§ 5-203, -301(d). The intended ward might do this because he objects
to the person appointed as guardian or, if the testamentary appointment is made on the
theory of mental incapacity, because he does not concede that he is incompetent. For an
example form, see PRACTICE MANUAL Form 113, at 445 (objection based on place of
residence of testamentary guardian).
71 U.P.C. §§ 5-303, -304. For forms of appointment order, see PRACTICE MANUAL
Form 99, at 424-25; Form 122, at 457-58 (appointment of a United States naval hos-
pital as guardian of a retired officer of the Regular Navy).
72 U.P.C. § 5-204. For a form of appointment order, see PRACTICE MANUAL Form
109, at 438.
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tition of any person interested in the welfare of the wardZ3 A
testamentary appointment as guardian of a mental incompetent may
be accepted only after notice to any organization "having his care
or to his nearest adult relative. '7 4  An organization that "has his
care and custody" is entitled to notice of hearing in a court proceed-
ing for appointment or removal of the guardian of a mental incom-
petent.75 An organization that "is caring for him or paying bene-
fits to him" may nominate "any competent person or a suitable insti-
tution" for appointment as guardian of a mental incompetent.7 6
A guardian of a minor is bound to "take reasonable care of his
ward's personal effects and commence protective proceedings if nec-
essary to protect other property of the ward." 77  He may "receive
money payable for the support of the ward. . under the terms of
any statutory benefit ... system," and apply them to the ward's cur-
rent needs for support, care, and education. Furthermore,
[hle must exercise due care to conserve any excess for the ward's
future needs unless a conservator has been appointed for the estate
of the ward, in which case excess shall be paid over at least an-
nually to the conservator. . . . A guardian may institute proceed-
ings to compel the performance by any [organization] of a duty
to support the ward or to pay sums for the welfare of the ward.
... A guardian must report the condition.., of the ward's estate
which has been subject to his possession or control, as ordered by
the Court on petition of any person interested in the minor's wel-
fare or as required by Court rule.7 8
A guardian of a mental incompetent has the same duties and, if a
conservator has not been appointed, similar powers as to money and
property 9
Although a guardian of a minor has power to institute proceed-
ings to get some kinds of Veterans' Administration pecuniary bene-
fits for his ward, he may not be able to compel their payment to him-
7a U.P.C. §§ 5-212, -307.
74U.P.C. § 5-301 as explained by § 1-210(29). For a form of notice to an orga-
nization caring for the ward, see PRACTICE MANUAL Form 112, pt. 3, at 442-43.
75U.P.C. § 5-309 as explained by § 1-201(29). For forms of notice and proof of
service, see PRACrICE MANuAL, Form 98, at 423 (notice to the Veterans' Administra-
tion); Form 120, at 454-55.
76U.P.C. § 5-311 as explained by § 1-201(29). For forms of nomination, see
PRACTICE MANUAL, Forms 94, 95, at 417-20; Forms 117, 118, at 450-52.
77U.P.C. § 5-209(a).
78U.P.C. § 5-209(b), (d), as explained by § 1-201(29). See also U.P.C. § 5-103.
For a form of receipt by the guardian for money paid for the support of a minor ward,
see PRACTICE MANUAL, Form 103, at 430-31.
79U.P.C. § 5-3 12. For a form of receipt by the guardian for property deliverable
to a mentally incompetent ward, see PRACTicE MAUAL, Form 110, 439-40.
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self because federal statutes permit the Veterans' Administration,
under some conditions, to pay the ward directly or to pay someone
else for his benefit instead of paying a guardian or conservator ap-
pointed under state law.80
A guardian's powers over property of his ward are limited to
(1) receipt on behalf of the ward of money or property volun-
tarily paid or delivered, (2) application of such money to the sup-
port, care, and education of the ward, and (3) preservation of both
excess money paid to him and of other property of the ward. If
litigation is needed to collect money or property for the ward or if
there is need for authority to invest money; to sell, mortgage, ex-
change or lease property; to enter into contracts; or to exercise pow-
ers of the ward, protective proceedings are necessary. Under Arti-
cle V of the Uniform Probate Code, the powers of the court in pro-
tective proceedings over the protected person's property and affairs
are much broader than those traditionally held by the courts which
supervise guardians of the estates of minors and mental incompe-
tents.8 In protective proceedings for a minor, "[T~he Court has
all those powers over the estate and affairs of the minor which are
or might be necessary for the best interests of the minor, his family
and members of his household.18 2  In protective proceedings for a
mental incompetent,
the Court has, for the benefit of the person and members of his
household, all the powers over his estate and affairs which he could
exercise if present[83J and not under disability, except the power
to make a will.84J These powers include, but are not limited
80 38 U.S.C. § 3202 (1970); 38 C.F.R. §§ 13.55-.64, 13.70-.103, 13.105 (1972);
see Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 320, § 21, 43 Star. 613. The Social Security Administra-
tion has much broader authority to pay benefits to its own designee instead of to a state-
appointed guardian or conservator. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j) (1970); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1601-
.1610 (1971).
81 See articles cited note 63 supra; 45 IowA L. REV. 264, 268-320; 64 MlcH. L
REV. 983, 984-85, 997-1000.
82 U.p.C. § 5-408(2).
83 The words "if present" refer to the fact that protective proceedings under Article
V of the Uniform Probate Code are not limited to minors and mental incompetents.
Such proceedings may be instituted for competent adults who are unable to manage their
own property and affairs effectively for such reasons as confinement (e.g., in a penitenti-
ary), detention by a foreign power (e.g., as a prisoner of war), or disappearance. See
U.P.C. § 5-401(2). The Code creates a presumption that a missing person died at
the end of five years after his disappearance. See U.P.C. § 1-107(3). During the five
year period protective proceedings may be appropriate. For a form of petition for ap-
pointment of a conservator of the estate of a prisoner of war, see PRACTIcE MANUAL
Form 126, at 466-67.
84 Although the court lacks power to make a will for a protected person, it can ac-
complish the same result by creating an inter vivos trust of his property with bene-
ficiaries who are to take it after his death.
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to power to make gifts, to convey or release his contingent and
expectant interests in property including marital property rights
and any right of survivorship incident to joint tenancy or tenancy
by the entirety, to exercise or release his powers as trustee, per-
sonal representative, custodian for minors, conservator, or donee of a
power of appointment, to enter into contracts, to create revocable
or irrevocable trusts of property of the estate which may extend
beyond his disability or life, to exercise options of the disabled
person to purchase securities or other property, to exercise his rights
to elect options and change beneficiaries under insurance and an-
nuity policies and to surrender the policies for their cash value, to
exercise his right to an elective share in the estate of his deceased
spouse and to renounce any interest by testate or intestate succession
or by inter vivos transfer.8 5
In protective proceedings the court may exercise its powers direct-
ly, without appointing a conservator.8" In the situation described in
example 2 (the Harrison Ranch) ,17 if the attending physicians
thought that Gertrude Jones would emerge from the coma or die
within a few weeks, it would be possible for the court to direct its
clerk to execute an oil lease of the Harrison Ranch to Criterion Oil
Company (Ohio). When, however, continuing management of
property is likely to be needed, the normal procedure would be for
the court to appoint a conservator of the estate of the protected per-
son.
An individual, bank, or trust company may be appointed con-
servator.88 The court may, but need not, require the conservator to
furnish a bond.89 The court may restrict the powers of a conserva-
tor by the terms of, or later endorsement on, his letters of appoint-
ment. 0 Thus it could restrict his powers to those of a guardian of
the estate under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, so that
he could not invest in anything but government securities without
prior order of the court." In the absence of such restrictions, a con-
servator has title as trustee to all property of the protected person"
and has power, without prior court authorization or subsequent court
approval, to make any investment which a trustee could make, to
s5U.P.C. § 5-408(3).
86U.P.C. § 5-409. For forms of petitions praying that the court, without appoint-
ing a conservator, enter an order exercising a power of appointment held by a person
under disability, see PRACTICE MANUAL Form 125, at 462-65.
87 Text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
88U.P.C. § 5-410. For a form of order appointing an individual as conservator,
see PRACTIcE MANUAL Form 99, at 424-25.
89U.P.C. §§ 5-411, 5-412.
90 U.P.C. § 5-426.
91 U.P.C. § 5-426, Comment; U.V.G.A. § 13 (1942 version).
92U.P.C § 5-420.
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sell, mortgage, or lease land or other property, to erect improvements,
and to pay or settle claims against the protected person or his es-
tate.9" A conservator must account to the court upon resignation or
removal and at other times as the court may direct.94 Though not
required by the Uniform Probate Code, the court could direct him
to conform to the accounting requirements imposed on a guardian
by the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. 5 Unless otherwise
directed, however, he need not account to the court on termination
of the protected person's minority or disability (by death or other-
wise) if he accounts to the former protected person or his personal
representative. 8
Like the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code as to admin-
istration of decedents' estates, the prominent feature of the Code
provisions as to conservators is flexibility. If the court appoints as
conservator the protected person's impoverished relative who is ig-
norant, inexperienced, possibly untrustworthy, and deficient in finan-
cial responsibility, it can require him to furnish a bond with de-
pendable sureties, to account to the court annually and at the termi-
nation of the conservatorship, to exhibit investment securities at the
time of accounting, and to secure a prior order of court before pay-
ing a claim, giving a lease or mortgage, making a sale, or investing
in anything but government bonds. This is the regime imposed by
the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. If, on the other hand,
the conservator is a bank, a trust company, or an experienced and
reputable businessman with ample means for responding in dam-
ages for maladminstration, the court may permit him to serve with
full powers without bond or accounting to the court. In effect, it
may put him in exactly the same position as a trustee under an inter
vivos trust instrument conferring broad administrative powers.
Any person who is interested in the estate, affairs, or welfare
of the person to be protected may institute protective proceedings. 7
Any governmental agency paying or planning to pay benefits to the
93 U.P.C. § 5-424. This section follows, generally, the UNIFORM TRUSTEES POWERS
AcT.
94U.P.C. § 5-419.
9 5 U.V.G.A. §§ 10, 11, 17 (1942 version). These sections require a guardian who
has received or shall receive on account of his ward anything of value from the Veterans'
Administration, on penalty of removal, to file an account annually with the court, ex-
hibit the securities held by him, send a copy of the account to the Veterans' Adminis-
tration, and have the account allowed by the court at a hearing held after fifteen days'
notice to the Veterans' Administration. The same procedure is required at the termi-
nation of the guardianship.
19 U.P.C. § 5-419.
97 Id. § 5-404.
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protected person is an interested person.98 Notice of the hearing
on the initial petition in a protective proceeding must be served on
the person to be protected, his spouse and parents, any interested
person who has filed a request for notice, and such other persons as
the court may direct.99 The petition must allege, to the extent
known, "any compensation, insurance, pension or allowance to
which" the person to be protected is entitled.1°° An allegation that
the person to be protected is entitled to compensation or pension
from the Veterans' Administration would, presumably, result in that
agency being notified, but the court would not be deprived of juris-
diction because of failure, due to ignorance or inadvertence, to give
such notice.1 ' In any event, the Veterans' Administration would
soon find out about the proceeding and any interested person, includ-
ing any governmental agency paying or planning to pay benefits to
the person to be protected, may file a request for notice, after which
it is entitled to notice before the entry of any order in the proceed-
ing.102 An organization that is caring for or paying benefits to the
person to be protected is entitled to consideration of its nomination
of an individual or corporation for appointment as conservator. 10 3
A governmental agency which is paying or planning to pay benefits
to the protected person may petition for an order (1) requiring the
conservator to furnish bond or security or additional bond or secu-
rity, (2) requiring the conservator to account, (3) removing the con-
servator and appointing another, or (4) granting other appropriate
relief.1 4 These provisions, coupled with its federal statutory power
to refuse to pay benefits to a conservator who neglects or refuses to
account to it 0 would seem to afford the Veterans' Administration
ample authority to continue its long-established practice of super-
vising guardians and conservators of its beneficiaries." 8
981d. § 5-406.
99 Id. § 5-405. For forms, see PRACriCE MANUAL Form 98, at 423 (notice to
Veterans' Administration); Form 127, at 468 (order directing notice by publication to
prisoner of war in enemy hands); Form 128, at 469 (notice by publication).
100 U.P.C. § 5-404(b). For a form of petition stating that the person to be pro-
tected is entitled to a pension for service in the Spanish American War, see PRACTIcE
MANUAL Form 94, at 417-19.
101 Compare text accompanying notes 3-19 supra.
102 U.P.C. § 5-406. For a form of request for notice filed by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, see PRACTICE MANUAL Form 97, at 422.
103 UP.C. § 5-410. Cf. form of order appointing a naval hospital guardian of a
retired naval officer on nomination of the Navy. PRACricE MANUAL Form 122, at 457.
104 U.P.C. §§ 5-406, -416 as explained by § 1-201(29).
105 38 U.S.C. § 3202 (1970).
10o8 Notes 40-43 supra & accompanying text.
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IV. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND
THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION
The Uniform Probate Code was promulgated in August 1969.107
Some three months later the Veterans' Administration issued a cir-
cular to its state chief attorneys, who represent it in guardianship
proceedings in state courts and before committees of state legisla-
tures.'0° The circular mentioned the adoption of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association and stated:
The proposed code represents a philosophy of "hands off" by the
court in protective proceedings after a conservator is appointed.
Strengthening of the code is necessary at least as to beneficiaries
of government agencies. The flagrant misuse and embezzlement
of funds of disabled veterans and their dependents before the
Guardianship Service was established and the Uniform Veterans'
Guardianship Act or similar legislation was enacted, are wel-known.
A need for these basic protective services continues. Cases occur in
every state each year which demonstrate the efficacy of protecting
the estates of the disabled.[' °09
• . There have been prepared some suggested amendments in
[sic] the Uniform Probate Code which will strengthen it without
emasculating it .... In developing these amendments, it has been
our intention to preserve the basic intent of the drafter of the
code. 110]
•.. The code, when enacted, will replace the Uniform Veterans'
Guardianship Act. Its modification is required to permit the
Guardianship Service to function effectively under state law in safe-
guarding VA benefits due persons under legal disability because of
minority or mental illness.["']
* . . In the case of the Uniform Probate Code, it is imperative
that the Chief Attorney do more than merely submit amendments
along the lines suggested here. He must actively advocate them
and do his utmost to see that they are given serious considera-
tion .... 112
The circular did not propose any amendment to the provisions
107 See note 64 supra.
108 Veterans' Administration, Dep't of Veterans' Benefits Circular 27-69-8, Dec. 8,
1969 [hereinafter cited as 1969 Circular].
109 Id. 3(c).
110 Id. 5 4.
M Id. 9 1.
112 Id. 5 2.
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of the Uniform Probate Code which relate to guardianship.1 3 Sev-
eral of the proposals made by the circular were fully consistent with
the circular's professed intention of strengthening the Code without
emasculating it and of preserving the basic intent of the drafters of
the Code. One such proposal was for amendment of the section
relating to notice at the inception of protective proceedings, but it
was limited to clarification and simplification of the notice proce-
dure;" 4 it did not propose to revive the objectionable features of sec-
tions 2 and 5 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act involved
in examples 1 (the Bates Farm) 15 and 2 (the Harrison Ranch). '
A second was for modification of the section relating to court ap-
pointment of an attorney for the person to be protected."17 A third
proposal was for clarification of the section relating to the status of
previously appointed guardians and conservators after the effective
date of the Uniform Probate Code. 18 A fourth expressed the need
for legislation like section 18 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardian-
ship Act, empowering state courts to commit mentally incompetent
veterans to Veterans' Administration hospitals."' The Uniform
Probate Code does not deal with commitment proceedings for men-
tal incompetents so its enactment would not be inconsistent with
keeping section 18 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act in
force.
1 20
Four other proposals for amendment made by the circular were
not, in the opinion of draftsmen of the Uniform Probate Code, con-
sistent with the circular's professed intention of not emasculating
the Code or disturbing the basic intent of its drafters.
Paragraph 7 of the circular proposed the following addition to
section 5-411:
118 U.P.C., art. V, pts. 2 & 3; see notes 68-80 supra & accompanying text. The
1969 Circular 5 15 explains this by saying:
It is not anticipated that the VA will seek the appointment of a guardian
under the code, but when a court fiduciary is required, a conservator will be
appointed. This will not prevent the certification [for receipt of VA bene-
fits] of a code guardian when he has already been appointed and when the
situation is such that a legal custodian would be recognized but for the exis-
tence of the guardian. Code guardians so recognized will be supervised in the
same manner as legal custodians.
114 1969 Circular 9 5 proposing amendment of U.P.C. § 5-405.
115 Text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
116 Text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
117 1969 Circular 9 6 proposing amendment of U.P.C. § 5-407.
118 Id. 9 13, proposing amendment of U.P.C. § 8-101.
119 Id. 5 14; U.V.G.A. § 18 (1942 version).
12°U.P.C. § 5-312(a)(1); see § 5-304 comment.
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(b) When any government agency is paying or planning to pay
benefits to a person to be protected, or his estate includes assets
derived in whole, or in part, from benefits heretofore paid by the
agency, the court shall, upon the request of the agency, require a
conservator to furnish a bond . . . in an amount not less than the
aggregate capital value of the property of the estate derived from
agency benefits in his control plus one year's estimated income
from the agency -but less.., the value of any land purchased with
agency benefits which the fiduciary, by express limitation of power,
lacks power to sell or convey without court authorization. 121
It is noteworthy that this provision would make a bond, or a re-
striction in the conservator's letters depriving him of power of sale
without special court authorization,' 22 mandatory at the option of any
government agency, if the protected person owned any land derived
in whole or in part from benefits paid by the agency, even though
the agency was not paying or planning to pay any benefit to him.
Since virtually all land west of the Appalachian Mountains was
granted by the United States, the Bureau of Land Management 23
would seem to be empowered to compel every conservator holding
such land to furnish bond or forfeit his power of sale. Even if the
land was not originally granted by the United States, the provision
would be triggered if, for example, the protected person owned a
farm and either (1) his great-great-great-grandfather used $10 of
Mexican War pension in paying for the farm in 1847;124 (2) his
great-great-grandfather used Civil War bounty money'2 to erect a
hog sty on the farm; (3) his great-grandfather used proceeds of a
sale of beans to the Navy Department in 1898 to erect a barn on
the farm; (4) his grandfather used his pay as a mail carrier to erect
a house on the farm; or (5) his father used a payment made to him
by the Coast Guard under the Federal Tort Claims Act 26 to build a
tractor shed on the farm. If all of these uses of federal benefits oc-
curred, the Veterans' Administration, the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, the United States Postal Service, or the
Coast Guard could compel the conservator to furnish bond for the
full value of the farm or give up his power to sell it, whether or not
121 1969 Circular 5 7 (emphasis added).
12 2 See notes 90-93 supra & accompanying text.
123 The Bureau of Land Management acquired the functions of the General Land Of-
fice by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, pt. IV, § 403 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 517
(1970)).
124 See Act of March 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 14, 2 Stat. 135; Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16,
§ 7, 9 Stat. 10.
125 See Act of July 22, 1861, ch. 9, § 5, 12 Star. 269; Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 24,
§ 5, 12 Star. 280; Act of July 5, 1862, ch. 133, § 6, 12 Stat. 509.
126 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1970).
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the agency was paying or planning to pay benefits to the protected
person. This is overkill with a vengeance.
Paragraph 8(b) of the circular proposed to amend section 5-
414127 to provide:
When the estate is derived, in whole or in part, from moneys
being paid by a government agency, the compensation allowed from
such moneys to the conservator shall be limited to five percent of
the amount of moneys received from the agency during the period
covered by the account. . . .No commission or compensation
shall be allowed on the moneys or other assets received from a prior
fiduciary nor upon the amount received from liquidation of loans
or other investments. 28
The five percent restriction is not limited to donative benefits
from a government agency; it extends to military and civil service
retirement pay and money paid to a government construction con-
tractor. For example, if the protected person were a construction
contractor engaged in building runways on Air Force bases and the
conservator was running his business for him, this restriction might
work very badly when the Air Force payments were at irregular in-
tervals based on times of project completion. Moreover, there
might be wholly inadequate compensation for the conservator's ser-
vices during a particular period. The first sentence of the proposed
amendment may mean that the conservator is entitled to no com-
pensation whatever for managing investments purchased with
money paid by a government agency. Finally, the last sentence
could be construed to mean that a conservator appointed to succeed
a conservator who had died or resigned could receive no compen-
sation at all for managing assets handled by the former conserva-
tor. If these included an office building, an apartment house, or a
factory, this would be grossly unfair. The last sentence is not ex-
pressly limited to assets derived from government agencies and so
might apply when the protected person had no assets derived whol-
ly, or in part, from moneys paid by a government agency. Perhaps
this is unimportant because no one except a very recent immigrant
is likely to be without any asset derived, wholly or in part, from
some money paid by some government agency to someone at some
time. Nearly everyone has received at least an income tax refund.
Paragraph 9(b) of the circular proposed to amend section
5-41912 to provide as follows:
127 This section entitles a conservator to "reasonable compensation."
128 1969 Circular 5 8.
129 Setext accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
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(a) Every conservator must account to the court for his admin-
istration of the trust upon his resignation or removal or when the
estate was derived, in whole or in part, from moneys paid by a
government agency upon termination of protected person's minor-
ity or disability, and at other times as the court may direct ...
(b) Any government agency which has paid or is paying bene-
fits for the protected person is entitled to a copy of any account
filed.... Each year in which an account is not filed with the court,
the conservator shall, if requested, submit an account to the ap-
propriate government agency. If such an account is not submitted
as requested, or if it is found unsatisfactory by the agency, the court
shall, upon receipt of notice thereof, require the conservator forth-
with to file an account with the court.'2 0
The proposed section 5-419 (a) would require a conservator to
account to the court whenever the estate is derived, in whole or in
part, from moneys paid by a government agency even though
neither the conservator nor the protected person himself has ever
received any money from a government agency. Hence this provi-
sion would be triggered by anything which would bring the amend-
ment proposed by paragraph 7 into operation.' Consequently, this
proposal would nullify the provision for accounting to the protected
person or his executor' in substantially all cases involving land or
other property previously owned by others. The proposed section
5-419(b) would entitle every government agency which has ever
paid money to the protected person to a copy of every account of the
conservator. If the protected person (1) served in the Marine Corps
between 1943 and 1945; (2) received a National Service Life Insur-
ance dividend in 1946; (3) worked as a typist for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in 1947; (4) received insurance proceeds
for loss of a parcel post package in 1948; (5) was awarded $20 un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1949 as a result of a collision
with a National Forest Service truck; (6) received benefits in 1950
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation incident to a bank
failure; (7) sold some vegetables to the Quartermaster Corps in
1951; (8) received an income tax refund in 1952; (9) was assisted
by a United States consul in a foreign country in 1953; and (10)
received a payment in 1954 from the Department of Agriculture
for not growing wheat, his conservator would be obliged to furnish
copies of his accounts to all ten government agencies, although none
of them is currently paying benefits to the protected person, none
has any interest in the protective proceedings, and none would do
130 1969 Circular 5 9 (emphasis added).
13 1 S etext accompanying notes 121-26 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
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anything with the copies of accounts sent to it. This is overkill
to the point of sheer absurdity. It would make protective proceed-
ings so expensive that only the wealthy could afford them.
Paragraph 12 of the circular proposed to amend section 5-426133
by adding the following subparagraph:
(c) Sections 5-424[134] and 5-425(a) and (b)[135J shall not ap-
ply to benefits paid by a government agency or to any estate de-
rived therefrom. A conservator shall not, except upon petition to
and prior order of the court after hearing, . . . make any invest-
ments with such funds except in direct unconditional interest-
bearing obligations of this state or the United States and in
obligations, the interest and principal of which are unconditionally
guaranteed by the United States.136
This provision would deprive a conservator of virtually all of
his powers of investment, administration, and distribution, without
special court authorization, as to assets derived from benefits paid
by any government agency, even though the protected person him-
self has never received benefits from a government agency and no
government agency plans to pay him benefits or has any other inter-
ist whatever in the conservatorship. This would seem to include
property purchased by anyone at any time in the past with money
paid to anyone in the past by any government agency, even though
the payments were due under government contracts, as bank deposit
or crop insurance proceeds, or were of civilian or military pay for
services rendered. There being no possible way to determine
whether particular property was, at some time, derived from govern-
ment benefits paid to someone, the net effect would be to make it
unsafe for anyone to buy property from or otherwise deal with a
conservator unless he secured prior court authorization for the trans-
action. No one would have merchantable title to land if there were
a conservator's deed in the chain of title and no court order. In
many cases, a conservator could not safely invest funds without such
an order although neither he nor the protected person ever received
183 See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
134 See text accompanying note 93 supra.
135 U.P.C. § 5-425 (a) and (b) empower a conservator to expand or distribute income
or principal of the estate without court authorization or confirmation for the support,
education, care, or benefit of the protected person and his dependents, including his
dependent parents, under carefully prescribed statutory guidelines and, if the estate is
ample, to make gifts to charity and other objects as the protected person might have
been expected to make, in amounts which do not in total for any year exceed 20 per-
cent of the income from the estate.
136 1969 Circular 5 12(b). The second sentence is derived from § 13 of the
U.V.G.A. (1942 version).
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a cent from any agency of the United States. The overkill of this
provision would be far worse than anything in the Uniform Vet-
erans' Guardianship Act, bad as it is.
Several months after the issuance of the December 1969 circu-
lar,"a7 the Veterans' Administration sought to learn the views of the
draftsmen of the Uniform Probate Code as to the desirability of
the amendments proposed by that circular. It learned them. In
September 1970 the Veterans' Administration issued a new circular,
superseding that of December 1969, that indicated a clear shift from
its previous position. 38
The revised circular modifies the amendment proposed by para-
graph 7 of the original circular' so as to require a conservator to
furnish a bond, upon request of the Veterans' Administration, only
"[wjhen the Veterans' Administration is paying or planning to pay
benefits to a person to be protected, or his estate includes assets
derived, in whole or in part, from benefits paid by the Veterans'
Administration to the conservator or his predecessor for the benefit
of such person .... 14o
The revised circular also modifies the first sentence of the amend-
ment proposed by paragraph 8 of the original circular' to restrict
it to "money paid or being paid by the Veterans' Administration to
the conservator or his predecessor for the benefit of the protected
person.... "14
In addition, the revised circular modifies the amendment pro-
posed by paragraph 9 of the original circular 4 3 so as to restrict the
requirement of a conservator's accounting to the court upon termina-
137 See note 108 supra.
138 Veterans' Administration, Dep't of Veterans' Benefit Circular 27-69-8, revised
as of Sept. 25, 1970 [hereinafter cited as 1970 Circular]. The 1970 Circular stated
5 3(c):
In December 1969, amendments to the code were proposed in DVB Circular
27-69-8. Comments on these indicate concern on the part of the drafters of
the code that the language used was too broad and would apply the provisions
of the amendments to cases in which the Federal Government has no interest.
This, in turn, would lead to complications in the affairs of protected persons
and cloud the title to property sold by a conservator. It must be conceded
there is some basis for this concern. With this in mind, the amendments
to the code have been redrafted as they appear here. For the most part, they
are limited in application to VA benefits paid for a specific beneficiary while
legally disabled. ...
139 See note 121 supra & accompanying text.
140 1970 Circular 5 7(b) (emphasis added).
141 See note 128 supra & accompanying text.
142 1970 Circular 5 8(b).
143 See note 130 supra & accompanying text.
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tion of the protected person's minority or disability to situations in
which the estate is derived, in whole or in part, from moneys paid
by the Veterans' Administration to the conservator or his predecessor
for the benefit of the protected person. It entitles only the Veterans'
Administration to a copy of the account and only "where the estate
consists, in whole or in part, of benefits paid by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration to the conservator or his predecessor for the benefit
"1144of the protected person ....
Finally, the revised circular modifies the amendment proposed by
paragraph 12 of the original circular145 so as to provide that "Sec-
tions 5-424 and 5-425 (a) and (b) shall not apply to benefits paid
by the Veterans' Administration to the conservator or his predeces-
sor for the benefit of the protected person or to any estate derived
therefrom." 146
The amendments proposed by the revised circular resemble the
1928 version of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 147 which
was much less objectionable than the 1942 version.148 They would
not invalidate the sale of the Bates Farm described in example 1
because no guardian or conservator of Alice Fox received any money
from the Veterans' Administration and the amendments do not in-
clude an equivalent of section 2 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardian-
ship Act.149  The amendments proposed by this circular would not
invalidate the oil lease of the Harrison Ranch described in example
2 because the Harrison Ranch was not derived from benefits paid
by the Veterans' Administration to the guardian of the estate of Ger-
trude Jones and the amendments do not include an equivalent of
the provision of section 5 of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship
Act 50 requiring a petition for the appointment of a guardian or
conservator to allege that the ward has been rated incompetent by
the Veterans' Administration on examination. The amendments pro-
posed by the revised circular would not invalidate the court order
described in example 3 authorizing purchase of 100 shares of S. S.
Pennyworth stock because the purchase was to be made with funds
not paid to the guardian of Quintilla Palmer by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration. They would, however, prevent Quintilla Palmer from
144 1970 Circular 5 9(b).
1 4 5 See note 136 supra & accompanying text.
146 1970 Circular 5 12(c).
47 Note 44 supra.
148Note 56 supra.
14 Note 6 supra & accompanying text.
15 Note 23 supra & accompanying text.
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taking advantage of her preemptive right to purchase an additional
100 shares'51 because her guardian attempted to make that purchase
with funds derived in part from payments made to him by the Vet-
erans' Administration. 52
On March 12, 1971, the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code accepted a proposal for amendment of the Code to
require personal service of notice on a person having the care and
custody of a person to be protected, 153 and indicated willingness to
add to section 5-41611 a provision to the effect that, on petition by
any governmental agency paying benefits to a protected person, the
court should give special weight to agency investment, compensa-
tion, and disposition standards established to assist the agency dis-
charge its obligation of seeing that governmental payments are ap-
plied to purposes for which they are intended. The Joint Editorial
Board was unwilling to accept the other amendments proposed by
the Veterans' Administration and expressed hope that the revised
circular of September 25, 1970,1" could be withdrawn. The Veter-
ans' Administration declined to withdraw the circular in a letter
from the Director of its Guardianship Service which suggests with
admirable clarity and precision the real issue involved:
The UPC contemplates and the efficacy of its proposals are depen-
dent on 'full power, high status' courts. This concept simply
flies in the face of judicial reality. As you gentlemen are well
aware, probate matters are currently handled among the various
states in courts ranging from superior courts of general jurisdiction
to courts presided over by laymen. The statutory structure sug-
gested by the VA provides guidelines and boundaries which permit
the various courts, of whatever power and status, to operate ef-
fectively.156
V. CONCLUSION
Article V of the Uniform Probate Code, with or without the
amendments proposed in 1970 by the Veterans' Administration, is
unquestionably preferable to the 1942 version of the Uniform Vet-
erans' Guardianship Act.'57 If a state entrusts the protection of
property of infants and mental incompetents to courts with appro-
151 See notes 38-39 supra & accompanying text.
152 See notes 37-38, 134-36, 145 supra & accompanying text.
153 Note 114 supra.
154 Note 104 supra & accompanying text.
1'5 Note 138 supra.
156 Veterans' Administration Dep't of Veterans' Benefits Information Bull. 27-71-1,
August 5, 1971.
15 Note 5 sapra.
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priate organization and adequate powers, and judges who are com-
petent, honest, fair-minded, and interested in this phase of their
work, Article V, without the proposed amendments, should be ade-
quate to enable the Veterans' Administration to perform its difficult
mission of supervising thousands of indigent guardians of indigent
recipients of its benefits. 158 If the courts entrusted with this pro-
tection lack such organization, powers, or judges, the pleas of the
Veterans' Administration Chief Attorney for the amendments he has
been directed to "actively advocate"159 should be heard with respect
and sympathy, In any event, the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship
Act should be repealed in every state which now suffers from its
overkill. 1 0
158 See notes 97-106 supra & accompanying text.
159 Note 112 supra & accompanying text
160 On July 1, 1972, the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act was repealed in Idaho
and replaced with Article V of the Uniform Probate Code, without the amendments
proposed by the Veterans' Administration but with an additional section recognizing
certificates issued by the Veterans' Administration as prima facie evidence of the neces-
sity for appointment of a guardian or conservator when they recite the age of a minor or
a Veterans' Administration rating of incompetence and that the appointment is a condi-
tion precedent to payment of money. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-5-101 to -501 (Supp.
1971). The additional section (§ 15-5-105) is based on sections 6 and 7 of the U.V.GA.
(1942 version).
